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I. THE APPRENDI/BLAKELY  “REVOLUTION” 
The word revolution in the law is frequently overused.  Seven 
years ago, the United States Supreme Court launched what many 
commentators have described as a sentencing revolution with its 
ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey.1  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is 
violated when a judge uses facts not found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum.2 
Next came Blakely v. Washington.3  Blakely pled guilty to a 
second-degree kidnapping offense involving a firearm.4  The State 
of Washington’s sentencing scheme provided that Blakely should 
have received a presumptive sentence between forty-nine and fifty-
three months for this offense.5  In addition, Blakely had a plea 
negotiation, which purportedly limited his potential sentence.6  
The judge, however, sentenced Blakely to ninety months, citing a 
Washington statute that allows a sentence of up to ten years if the 
 
       †  Judge, Hennepin County District Court, 1984–present; Adjunct Professor, 
University of Minnesota Law School, 1986–present, and St. Thomas Law School, 
2003–present.  J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1975.  Special thanks to 
Laura Taken and Patrick Barrett who helped with this article. 
 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 476. 
 3. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 4. Id. at 299. 
 5. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.320 (2000)). 
 6. Id. at 300. 
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judge finds justification for the imposition of an “exceptional” 
sentence.7  The judge “found” that Blakely committed the offense 
with deliberate cruelty.8 
The facts that led to his sentence were horrific.  In October 
1998, Blakely bound his wife with duct tape and forced her at 
knifepoint into a wooden box in his pickup truck.9  Threatening his 
wife with a shotgun, Blakely told their thirteen-year-old son that his 
mother would be shot if he did not follow them in another car.10  
Although the boy eventually escaped, Blakely drove his wife all the 
way from Grant County, Washington to Montana before he was 
arrested.11 
The United States Supreme Court reversed Blakely’s sentence 
and held that all facts, other than prior criminal convictions, that 
increase a defendant’s sentence beyond what it had been absent 
those facts must be presented to a jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.12  In the majority’s view, the right to a jury trial 
means not only that the defendant has a right to present a case to 
the jury on the issue of guilt, but it also means that a defendant has 
the right to have a jury, not a judge, make all the factual findings 
required to impose a sentence longer than the recommended 
sentence under the sentencing guidelines.13  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia stated that Blakely was, in effect, sentenced 
for first-degree kidnapping after being convicted of second-degree 
kidnapping.14  For this reason, the majority said the defendant was 
denied the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial.15  The 
Court did not consider whether the punishment was too harsh; it 
only considered whether the decision-making process was 
constitutional.16 
[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi 
rights.  When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to 
seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the 
defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or 
 
 7. Id. at 299–300. 
 8. Id. at 300. 
 9. Id. at 298. 
 10. Id. 
 11. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 12. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 
 13. See id. at 304. 
 14. Id. at 307. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. 
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consents to judicial factfinding.  If appropriate waivers are 
procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding 
as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.  
Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial 
factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well 
be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him 
at trial.17 
For many, the decision in Blakely crystallized the fears that they 
had when Apprendi was decided.  From the bench, Justice 
O’Connor read from her dissenting opinion, a practice that was, 
for her, an unusual display of disagreement with the majority: 
“[T]he practical consequences of today’s decision may be 
disastrous . . . .”18  Predictably, shortly after Blakely, the United 
States Supreme Court “remedied” the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines’ Sixth Amendment problem by making the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines effectively advisory.19 
Just this term, the Supreme Court found California’s 
sentencing law unconstitutional.20  California had a three-tier 
determinate sentencing scheme that set each term of 
imprisonment—lower, middle, and upper—at an exact number of 
years.21  The Supreme Court found that this ran afoul of Apprendi’s 
“bright-line rule.”22  Because the sentencing law mandated that 
judges impose the middle term unless they found additional 
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court 
held that the middle term, and not the upper term, was the 
relevant statutory maximum.23  In order to impose the upper term, 
the sentencing judge necessarily had to engage in fact-finding that 
was in contravention of the holding in Apprendi.24 
II. BLAKELY IN MINNESOTA 
An awful lot has been written about the Apprendi/Blakely 
sentencing “revolution,” almost all of which has focused on the 
right to a jury trial.  Blakely, however, stands for much more than 
 
 17. Id. at 310 (citations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 314 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 19. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 20. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 870 (2007). 
 21. Id. at 861–62 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5 (West 1999)). 
 22. Id. at 868. 
 23. Id. at 871. 
 24. Id. at 868; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. 
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giving the relatively few defendants who have committed egregious 
crimes an opportunity to argue against enhanced sentences before 
a jury.  It may be that the most important aspect of the revolution is 
not the right to a jury trial, but the obligation of those who seek 
enhanced sentences to establish their justification beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Although it certainly unnerved a number of people, the 
Apprendi/Blakely revolution did not cause earth-shattering change 
in Minnesota.  In their article, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s 
Blast, Richard Frase and Dale Parent noted: 
The [Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines] Commission’s 
policy choices—in particular, its decision to approach 
guideline development as a policy-making process rather 
than an effort to codify past sentencing practices, and its 
rejection of “real-offense” sentencing—resulted in 
proposed guidelines that lacked several features that 
made the federal guidelines highly vulnerable to Blakely 
attack.25 
Frase and Parent also noted that the impact of Blakely was 
minimized in Minnesota because Minnesota judges never had the 
authority to “enhance a sentence based on offenses for which the 
defendant had not been charged or for which charges had been 
dropped.”26  Likewise, Minnesota prohibits departures based on a 
prediction that a defendant might commit an offense in the 
future.27 
In the twenty-seven years since the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines’ implementation, the percentage of upward departures 
has been relatively small.  The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted 
“a very deferential standard of review” when considering a judge’s 
decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines.28  It appears that 
there is not a single case in which a reviewing court has overturned 
a trial court’s imposition of the presumptive guideline sentence in 
 
 25. Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s 
Blast, 18 FED. SENT. R. 12, 12 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 14 (citing State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. 1982); State 
v. Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981)). 
 27. Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 14 (citing State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d 
701, 703 (Minn. 1982); State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981)). 
 28. See Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 15 (citing State v. Kindem, 313 
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).  “[W]e do not intend entirely to close the door on 
appeals from refusals to depart.  However, we believe that it would be a rare case 
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.”  Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. 
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favor of an enhanced sentence.29  While there are certain types of 
cases, such as drug cases, that have had unusually high departure 
rates, the deferential standard of review has “reinforced the 
presumption in favor of imposing the recommended guidelines 
sentence and made clear that when unusual circumstances are 
present, judges are authorized but not required to depart.”30 
Although the federal circuits and many states have struggled 
with post-Blakely litigation, Minnesota has seen most of the 
fundamental issues of the post-Blakely sentencing framework 
resolved in four decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  In 
State v. Shattuck,31 the court held that upward durational departures 
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were subject to Blakely 
requirements.32  The court thus rejected all three of the options 
considered by Justice Breyer in United States v. Booker:33 (1) totally 
invalidating the sentencing guidelines, (2) excision of all provisions 
that made the guidelines mandatory, or (3) grafting onto the 
guidelines a set of judge-made procedures for a jury trial of 
aggravating facts.34 
In State v. Houston,35 the court addressed retroactivity issues, 
holding that Blakely is a new rule but not a “watershed” rule 
requiring full retroactivity.36  Blakely, therefore, applies to all cases 
still pending on direct review at the time Blakely was decided, which 
was the case in Shattuck.  But, Blakely does not apply to defendants 
like Houston whose convictions had already become final. 
In State v. Osborne,37 Osborne was convicted on twenty-three 
counts of drug-related offenses.38  He appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.39  The Minnesota Supreme Court denied 
review.40  Soon after, Blakely was decided, and Osborne moved to 
 
 29. There are only a small handful of cases where a reviewing court has 
rejected a trial court’s downward departure in favor of a guideline sentence.  See, 
e.g., State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999); State v. Law, 620 
N.W.2d 562, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 30. Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 15. 
 31. 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005). 
 32. Id. at 144. 
 33. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 34. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 146–47 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 246–67). 
 35. 702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005). 
 36. Id. at 273. 
 37. 715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 2006). 
 38. Id. at 438. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
5
Burke: State v. Dettman: The End of the Sentencing Revolution or Just th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
3. BURKE - RC.DOC 4/22/2007  4:25:17 PM 
1336 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
reopen the appeal of his sentence for review of an alleged Blakely 
error.41  The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Shattuck applied 
and granted Osborne’s motion to reopen the appeal.42  In the 
appeal, the State argued that “Osborne [had] forfeited his Blakely 
claim for purposes of appeal by failing to raise the claim in the 
district court.”43  The majority wrote that the jurisprudence in 
Minnesota has “consistently rejected any Blakely-type claim, holding 
that an upward departure from a presumptive sentence does not 
present any Sixth Amendment issues under Apprendi, so long as the 
sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence authorized by 
the legislature in the statute.”44  The court noted that it was 
reasonable that Osborne would not foresee this new rule of law, 
especially since it had been consistently rejected by the Minnesota 
courts.45  For reasons of judicial economy, it was also reasonable for 
Osborne not to object on grounds that the courts had definitively 
rejected.46  The court held that “Osborne did not forfeit 
consideration of Blakely errors for purposes of . . . appeal”47 because 
the law is clear that a right to a jury trial cannot be waived by 
silence.48  Rather, the court “require[d] that the waiver be 
affirmatively made, after a full advisory and a searching inquiry to 
be certain that it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”49  The 
court also found that just as a defendant cannot be convicted of 
both a charged offense and a lesser-included offense for the same 
criminal act, “the elements of lesser-included offenses under [the 
pertinent statute] cannot support upward sentencing departures.”50  
The court further found that “because the factors on which the 
upward departures were based were neither found by the jury nor 
admitted to by Osborne, Osborne’s sentence was imposed in 
violation of Blakely.”51 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 442 (footnote and internal citation omitted). 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 446. 
 48. Id. at 442. 
 49. Id. at 444. 
 50. Id. at 447 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 609.04, subdiv. 1(4) (2006)).  But 
the court clarified, in a footnote, that they “do not render a decision on whether 
guilty verdicts on lesser-included offenses defined by other provisions of Minn. 
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1, can be used to support upward departures.”  Id. at 447 n.7. 
 51. Id. at 447.  Having concluded that Osborne had not waived his right to a 
6
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Finally, in State v. Dettman,52 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that an upward departure based on the trial court’s findings of 
aggravated factors, without the express, knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver by a defendant of his right to have a jury make 
those findings, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.53  The court held that the defendant’s statements to the 
police were not admissions on which the trial court could base an 
upward departure.54 
The facts in Dettman, although not as egregious as Blakely, 
certainly tested the outer limits.  The defendant called the victim, 
asking her to “come to his apartment to assist her boyfriend” 
because he “was in trouble.”55  After she arrived, the defendant 
“told her that her boyfriend had gone to purchase cigarettes,” so 
she entered the apartment to wait for her boyfriend’s return.56  The 
defendant then tried to cover the victim’s mouth with duct tape.57  
“When [the victim] fought back, [the defendant] restrained her 
and told her to be quiet or he would cut her throat.”58  The 
defendant then made the victim “get undressed and get on his bed 
where he penetrated her vaginally with his fingers and put his 
mouth on her vagina.”59  The defendant also “ordered [the victim] 
to sit on his face and urinate into his mouth.”60  At some point the 
attack was interrupted by the Rochester police, who found the 
victim “naked on Dettman’s bed with blood around her mouth.”61  
The police found the defendant with a knife in his pants pocket.62 
The trial court inquired as to Dettman’s waiver of his rights 
when he entered his plea.63  The judge asked Dettman if he “knew 
that there was no agreement regarding what his sentence would be, 
and . . . that ‘the actual sentence will be up to the judge’” after 
 
jury trial during the sentencing phase, the court engaged in a harmless error 
analysis.  Id.  It found that “the Blakely error was necessarily prejudicial, not 
harmless.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 52. 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006). 
 53. Id. at 651, 655. 
 54. Id. at 655. 
 55. Id. at 646. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 646–47. 
 60. Id. at 647. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 656 (Gildea, J., dissenting). 
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hearing the arguments of both attorneys.64  The judge informed 
Dettman that the defense was free to make a motion for a 
departure downward from the sentencing guidelines and that the 
prosecution could do the same for an upward departure.65  The 
judge asked Dettman if he understood that “‘there are no 
guarantees about whether either of these motions would be 
granted and it’s possible that you could be sentenced to longer 
than 144 months.’”66  Dettman indicated that he understood and 
that he wanted to proceed with his guilty plea.67 
The judge sentenced Dettman to 216 months in prison.  The 
presumptive sentence was 144 months.68  The judge based the 72-
month upward departure on the particular cruelty with which the 
offense was committed and the lasting psychological impact on the 
victim.69  With respect to the particular cruelty factor, the judge 
“determined” that Dettman: (1) exploited his knowledge of the 
victim’s relationship with her boyfriend to lure her to Dettman’s 
apartment; (2) subjected the victim to multiple forms of 
penetration; (3) planned and prepared for the assault by 
precutting the duct tape that he tried to use to silence her; and (4) 
ordered the victim to engage in especially repulsive acts.70 
In fairness to the trial judge, it was not until Dettman’s appeal 
was pending before the Minnesota Court of Appeals that the 
United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington.71  The 
trial judge was therefore not in a position to know that an express 
waiver of a jury determination was necessary.  The principal issue 
decided in Dettman was whether the defendant admitted to certain 
facts used in sentencing as part of his guilty plea and therefore had 
waived his right to claim that only a jury, not a judge, could 
determine the existence of aggravating factors.72 
The prosecution contended that Blakely does not require an 
express waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating 
sentencing factors before a defendant’s admission may be used to 
 
 64. Id. at 656–57. 
 65. Id. at 657. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 647 (majority opinion). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 72. See Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 647–48. 
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enhance his sentence.73  The majority opinion written by Chief 
Justice Anderson noted that “several federal courts of appeals have 
upheld upward sentencing departures based on facts admitted at a 
sentencing hearing, a plea hearing, or in a plea agreement, without 
requiring an express waiver of the right to a jury determination of 
aggravating sentencing factors.”74  Nevertheless, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that an explicit waiver of Blakely is required.75  
Chief Justice Anderson stated: 
We believe our approach is preferable to that of the 
federal circuits because our approach more appropriately 
takes into account long-standing principles regarding a 
defendant’s waiver of his jury-trial rights.  We agree with 
the Colorado Supreme Court that a waiver requirement 
“furthers the central goal of Blakely, which was to correct a 
system ‘in which the defendant, with no warning in either 
his indictment or plea, would routinely see his maximum 
sentence balloon from as little as five years to as much as 
life imprisonment.’”76 
Justice Laurie Gildea and Justice Alan Page dissented.77  In her 
dissent, Justice Gildea stated, “Every federal circuit court of appeals 
has indicated that sentencing courts do not run afoul of Blakely or 
the Sixth Amendment when they rely on a defendant’s admissions 
of fact in sentencing.”78  Curiously, she wrote, “Even though 
Dettman is arguing that a ‘right’ based on the U.S. Constitution has 
been violated, the majority dismisses the federal cases without 
discussion, and relies instead on certain state cases.”79 
While reasonable minds might differ as to how explicit a 
waiver of Blakely rights should be, the fact is that Minnesota has also 
not followed federal law with regard to waivers in other areas.  For 
example, in State v. Spann,80 the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that any agreement between the prosecution and a defendant that 
 
 73. Id. at 649. 
 74. Id. at 653 (citing United States v. Pittman, 418 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Monsalve, 388 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lucca, 377 
F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 75. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 655. 
 76. Id. at 653 (quoting People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190, 1195 (Colo. 2006)). 
 77. Id. at 656. 
 78. Id. at 659 (Gildea, J., dissenting) (referencing United States v. Saldivar-
Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 79. Id. at 659. 
 80. 704 N.W.2d 486 (2005). 
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requires the defendant to waive all rights to appellate review in 
exchange for a reduced sentence was invalid as a matter of public 
policy and violated the defendant’s right to due process.81  Justice 
Page, who wrote the opinion in Spann, said, “We recognize that a 
majority of other jurisdictions have held that allowing a defendant 
to waive his right to appeal is not inherently illegal or unfair.”82  
Justice Russell Anderson, the author of the opinion in Dettman, 
dissented in Spann, stating that he would have sent “the matter to 
the district court for a more comprehensive inquiry as to the 
validity of Spann’s waiver of those rights.”83 
Historically, Minnesota courts have strictly construed the 
requirements for allowing a defendant to waive his or her right to a 
jury trial.84  The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure state that: 
The defendant, with the approval of the court may waive 
jury trial provided the defendant does so personally in 
writing or orally upon the record in open court, after 
being advised by the court of the right to trial by jury and 
after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.85 
Approval of waiver by the trial court is discretionary and can only 
be made where the court finds that the defendant was informed of 
his or her rights and that the waiver was, in fact, voluntary.86  
Finally, Minnesota courts are adamant that a defendant personally 
waive his or her right to a trial and disallow waiver by the 
defendant’s attorney.87 
 
 81. Id. at 494–95. 
 82. Id. at 491 (referencing State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. 1987); 
United States v. Nave, 302 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 83. Id. at 495 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 84. See State v. Ulland, 357 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a)–(b)). 
 85. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a); see State v. Neumann, 392 
N.W.2d 706, 707–09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting a defendant’s waiver even 
though the defendant received a group advisory at his first hearing and a mailed 
advance notice of a non-jury trial). 
 86. See State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 889–90 (Minn. 1979); Gaulke v. 
State, 184 N.W.2d 599, 602–03 (Minn. 1979). 
 87. See State v. Tlapa, 642 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. 
Sandmoen, 390 N.W.2d 419, 424–25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  But see State v. Ford, 
276 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Minn. 1979) (“While we intended to make it clear that the 
waiver should be by defendant, not by his counsel, in this case defendant was 
present [in court] when his counsel made the waiver and defendant may well be 
said to have ratified the waiver and made it his personal act.”). 
10
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III. BLAKELY AND DETTMAN: MOVING FORWARD 
If State v. Dettman88 represents the culmination of the structural 
sentencing framework in Minnesota created by Blakely,89 where does 
the revolution go now?  Certain issues seem obvious.  First, how will 
appellate courts in Minnesota review Blakely departures?  Second, 
how will lawyers present arguments and evidence in departure 
cases when the issues are less well-defined, such as those factors 
cited by the trial judge in Dettman?  Third, although Minnesota 
does not, as a matter of law, consider evidence of diminished 
capacity as relevant in the guilty phase of a trial, would that same 
standard be true if the evidence was offered to negate a departure 
fought by the prosecution on grounds similar to those advanced in 
Dettman? 
Before Blakely, the question in Minnesota on appellate review 
was whether the trial court was justified in departing from a 
presumptive sentence.90  In the post-Blakely era of jury 
determination of the facts for sentence enhancement, appellate 
courts will face new issues.  For example, one appellate issue is 
whether the jury’s finding of an enhancement factor had a 
sufficient factual basis—akin to sufficiency of evidence for guilt.  A 
second appellate issue is whether, even if the jury verdict is 
supported by the evidence, the discretion of the judge is still an 
issue in determining whether the district court properly applied its 
discretion in deciding to depart based on the jury’s findings.  A 
third issue is whether appellate courts will, for the first time, begin 
to examine the justifications for sentencing to the presumptive 
sentence but count the ends of the allowable range. 
The essence of the justification for the departure in Dettman 
was cruelty.  But what is “cruelty” under Minnesota sentencing law?  
When judges alone were determining cruelty, Minnesota courts 
made little attempt to define the term, and a variety of appellate 
court opinions held that there really was no standard for making 
this determination.91  In Holmes v. State,92 the court concluded that 
the departure for cruelty was unjustified because the conduct was 
 
 88. 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006). 
 89. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 90. See, e.g., Ture v. State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 1984); State v. Blue 
327 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Minn. 1982). 
 91. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589–90 (Minn. 1996). 
 92. 437 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1989). 
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not significantly different from that typically involved in the 
commission of that particular crime.93  The court held in State v. 
Hanson94 that a departure for cruelty was not warranted because the 
defendant did not commit manslaughter in a manner significantly 
more serious than a typical manslaughter.95  In State v. Bicek,96 the 
defendant’s wife and child died in an explosion.97  He was charged 
with first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree culpable 
negligence manslaughter.98  At the State’s request, the trial court 
departed upward, but the appellate court reversed, holding that 
particular cruelty was not applicable to a reckless offense that is not 
intended to harm.99 
When determining whether a departure is warranted, the 
“core issue” for a trial court is “whether the defendant’s conduct 
was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in 
the commission of the crime.”100  In a system where the jury 
determines the existence of aggravating factors, a whole range of 
fundamental issues are brought to the fore.  For example, “the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a . . . statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”101  
Due process requires that criminal statutes provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary 
enforcement.102  A statute is unconstitutional when it “delegates 
basic policy matters to . . . juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.”103  Definitions of aggravating factors 
that are left entirely to the imagination of the jury will create a 
significant issue for appellate review of the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines’ applications. 
 
 93. Id. at 59–60. 
 94. 405 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1987). 
 95. Id. at 469. 
 96. 429 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 97. Id. at 290. 
 98. Id. at 290–91. 
 99. Id. at 291–92. 
 100. State v. Thao, 649 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2002) (citing State v. Back, 341 
N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. 1983)). 
 101. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 102. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 103. Id. at 108–09. 
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“Cruelty” is a term that can be defined differently from one 
juror to the next.  “When a jury is the final sentencer [sic],” the 
United States Supreme Court requires juries to be “properly 
instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process.”104  In 
Maynard v. Cartwright,105 the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” 
aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague when given to a 
sentencing jury without further definition.106  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia107 overturned a defendant’s 
sentence because the aggravating factor at issue—whether the 
crime committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and 
inhuman”—did not give the jury guidance concerning the statute’s 
meaning.108  In Walton v. Arizona,109 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the Maynard Court’s holding that the bare terms of the aggravating 
factor were facially vague and further stated that in the context of 
sentencing by a jury, the vagueness problem could be fixed by 
applying a constitutional limiting instruction.110  In Walton, the 
Court ruled that the use of the aggravating factor was constitutional 
because a judge, rather than a jury, was determining whether the 
factor existed.111  The Court reasoned that “[t]rial judges are 
presumed to know the law and apply it in making their 
decisions.”112 
To date, there have been relatively few Blakely sentencing jury 
trials.  If there is a norm, it is that defendants are far more likely to 
waive a jury trial for purposes of sentencing than they are to waive a 
jury trial for purposes of determining guilt.  The fear is that issues 
such as particular cruelty or that the offense is more serious than is 
typical require context.  Presenting context to a jury is not easy.  
Will the parties be able to call expert witnesses?  And if so, who 
would they be?  Would the parties be able to introduce departure 
reports of other similar cases? 
 
 104. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990); see also Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427–28 
(1980). 
 105. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 
 106. Id. at 363–64; see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 652–53. 
 107. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
 108. Id. at 428–29. 
 109. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 110. Id. at 653. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Another potential question is raised when juries are 
responsible for determining aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The court must determine the permissibility of 
evidence that is not directly related to particular cruelty, but might 
mitigate a jury determination in favor of departures such as the 
defendant’s diminished capacity.  On the issue of guilt, Minnesota 
does not recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity.113  The 
court in State v. Bouwman114 stated that allowing the use of this 
doctrine would “inevitably open[] the door to variable or sliding 
scales of criminal responsibility”115 where the law “requires a final 
decisive moral judgment of the culpability of the accused.”116  In 
State v. Provost,117 the court, in a pre-Blakely world, criticized the 
doctrine because it “seeks to make the punishment fit the crime by, 
in effect, changing the crime (or at least by transferring the 
sentencing function from the judge to the jury).”118 
At the sentencing phase, however, Minnesota juries might 
consider a defendant’s diminished capacity in determining 
whether an upward departure is justified.  The Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a defendant “lacked 
substantial capacity for judgment” because of a “mental 
impairment,” then such impairment may be used as a mitigating 
factor.119  In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. 
Wall120 that while the existence of a mitigating factor does not 
require a downward departure, it “[cannot] properly be ignored” 
when departing upward.121  In that case, the defendant strangled 
his wife while she was apparently sleeping.122  The trial court viewed 
these circumstances as an aggravating factor because the defendant 
“preyed upon the reduced physical capacity of the victim.”123  The 
 
 113. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (citing Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 88 (D.C. 1976)). 
 116. Id. at 706 (citing Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 
1945)). 
 117. 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1992). 
 118. Id. at 100. 
 119. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY II.D.103(a)(3), available at http://www.msgc.state. 
mn.us (follow “Guidelines” hyperlink; then follow “Sentencing Guidelines and 
Commentary (Revised August 01, 2006)” hyperlink). 
 120. 343 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1984). 
 121. Id. at 25. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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Minnesota Supreme Court, however, rejected the trial court’s 
finding because the defendant clearly “lacked substantial capacity 
for judgment.”124 
Alexis de Tocqueville once said, “In a revolution, as in a novel, 
the most difficult part to invent is the end.”125  State v. Dettman may, 
at least for Minnesota, be the end of the structural debate of how to 
implement the Apprendi/Blakely sentencing revolution.  Minnesota 
will require explicit waiver of a jury, just as it does with jury waivers 
on issues of guilt.  Where the rest of the sentencing revolution ends 
is unclear.  Among the things we do not know is how the attorneys’ 
sentencing presentations will unfold before juries, nor do we know 
how appellate courts will review them.  That part of the sentencing 
revolution is yet to be invented. 
 
 
 124. Id.; see also State v. Sanford, 450 N.W.2d 580, 587–88 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990), petition for rev. granted, (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990), order granting rev. vacated 
(Minn. Mar. 22, 1990) (stating that aggravating factors justify upward departure, 
even if defendant’s mental illness was mitigating factor); State v. Stephani, 369 
N.W. 2d 540, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming upward departure where court 
specifically found the defendant did not “lack substantial capacity” for judgment). 
 125. STEPHEN M. WALT, REVOLUTION AND WAR 331 (1996). 
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